

U S S R I N T E R N A T I O N A L A F F A I R S

Sept. 16, 1958

TEXT OF SOVIET NOTE ON SURPRISE ATTACK

Moscow, TASS, in English. Hellschreiber to Europe, Sept. 15, 1958,
2225 GMT--L

(Text) Moscow--The following is the full text of the Soviet Government's note to the U.S. Government of Sept. 15, 1958.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR presents its compliments to the embassy of the United States of America and, referring to the embassy's note No. 126 of July 31, 1958, has the honor to state the following:

The Soviet Government notes the favorable attitude of the U.S. Government to the proposal, set forth in the message sent by N.S. Khrushchev, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to President Dwight Eisenhower on July 2 of this year and suggesting the competent representatives, including representatives of the military departments of the two sides, appointed by the governments of the USSR and the United States, and, possibly, representatives of some other states, should meet in the near future for a joint study of the practical aspects of the problem of preventing surprise attack and should draft within a certain period, limited in advance, recommendations on measures to prevent the possibility of surprise attack.

Proposing a conference on experts' level, the Soviet Government proceeded from the assumption that such a conference would be useful only if its work is aimed at drafting practical recommendations on measures to prevent surprise attack in combination with definite steps in the sphere of disarmament.

As the U.S. Government will remember, the message of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of July 2 says that the Soviet Union suggests to agree on setting up control posts at railway junctions, major ports, and motor roads, in combination with definite steps in the field of disarmament and aerial survey of regions which are of great importance for averting the threat of surprise attack. Thus the assertions by the U.S. Government that the Soviet Government supposedly agrees that these discussions should not predetermine the corresponding position of both governments with regard to the timing and interdependence of various aspects of disarmament, are groundless.

It is understood that the experts will have to pay serious attention to such technical problems as means and objects of control and the results which might be secured by these measures.

As the Soviet Government has already stated, agreement on measures to prevent surprise attack is quite feasible provided fair consideration is given to mutual interests and such actions as would aggravate the international situation and increase the risk of war are renounced. Of course, the decision to set up on reciprocal principles a system to prevent the possibility of surprise attack must be taken by the governments and not by the experts who will only do the preparatory work. However, the drafting by the experts of practical recommendations on concrete ways of preventing surprise attack, undoubtedly, will facilitate a fruitful discussion by a heads of governments conference of the question of preventing surprise attack.

The note of the U.S. embassy again raises the question of flights by military planes of the United States in the Arctic region and of the Arctic zone of inspection. In that note the Government of the United States gives the categorical assurance that the United States has never found it necessary to carry on flights by military planes loaded with hydrogen and atomic bombs toward the frontiers of the Soviet Union. However, one cannot but point out that the statement of the U.S. Government alleging that American atomic bombers are not flying toward the frontiers of the USSR looks unconvincing in the light of the speeches by its representatives in the U.N. Security Council and the statement made by Mr. Dulles, Secretary of State of the United States, at a press conference on May 1.

It will be recalled that Mr. Dulles bluntly said in this statement that if the Soviet Union agreed to the introduction of international inspection in the Arctic region the United States would regard as safe to reduce to a minimum these flights against which the Soviet Union protested. When asked whether the United States would put an end to such flights if inspection in the Arctic region is established, Mr. Dulles states that this would depend on the information obtained by the United States as a result of this inspection. These statements by Mr. Dulles clearly confirm the flights by American planes carrying atomic and hydrogen bombs toward the frontiers of the Soviet Union. As regards the Arctic zone of inspection touched upon in the note of the U.S. embassy the Soviet Union's stand on this question has been exhaustively explained earlier.

As for the practical aspect of convening an experts conference, the Soviet Government does not object to the date and venue of the experts conference, proposed by the United States in the note of July 31. But if the U.S. Government would not be ready by the aforesaid date, we have no objection to convening the conference later as proposed in the note of the U.S. embassy of Sept. 8. Proceeding from this, the Soviet Government suggests that the experts conference should open in Geneva on Nov. 10 envisaging that its work could be concluded as soon as possible, for instance, within four or five weeks.

The Soviet Government thinks it would be advisable for other countries to take part in the experts conference besides the USSR and the United States. In so doing the Soviet Government deems it necessary to proceed from the principle of parity of Atlantic pact members and Warsaw treaty organization members. Taking this into consideration, the Soviet Government proposes that representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Rumania should take part in the experts conference.

It goes without saying that the United Nations will be informed of the progress of talks of experts through the U.N. Secretary General. The Soviet Government hopes that the U.S. Government will carefully examine the considerations set forth in this note and will give a positive reply to the proposals made in it.

WEST STALLS ON NUCLEAR TEST BAN ACCORD

Moscow, Soviet European Service in English, Sept. 15, 1958, 1700 GMT--L

(Text) If anyone did sense a feeling of relief after the United States and Britain agreed to talks on banning tests of nuclear weapons then this feeling must have faded rather quickly, for the Anglo-American duet was accompanied by a series of new nuclear explosions. The United States conducted them in the Pacific, the British on Christmas Island. And then came a new American series of tests in Nevada.

Nothing has happened which could testify to U.S. and British ruling circles having decided to stop poisoning the atmosphere with radioactive substances. If such a decision had been taken, there would not have been the present series of tests, the most intensive, and therefore having the most pernicious effects.

The new proposal put forward by the United States and Great Britain has not been made sincerely. It was forced from them. That this is the case, a glance back at recent history will show. On Mar. 1, 1954, the Americans exploded their H-bomb on Bikini in the Pacific, and area of 7,000 square miles was contaminated with deadly radiation. Twenty-three Japanese fishermen, who were far beyond what had been announced as the danger zone, fell victims of radiation disease. About 300 people living on the Marshall Islands also suffered.

It was after this that the question of the baneful effects of atomic explosions became the concern of not only scientists. Millions of people realized mankind was threatened with a new danger, one it had no ways of averting. Fish could be caught in other rivers than those contaminated by the waste from chemical plants. Farms could be moved to fields other than those poisoned by gas in the First World War. Man had learned to fight epidemics a long time ago. But there is nothing that can replace the atmosphere we breathe and man has no means of cleansing the atmosphere of radioactivity or of stopping it from spreading to the earth, to plants, and food products.

The new hazards were so terrifying that the American Federation of Scientists deemed it necessary to issue a special statement. With some sense of desperation, as the authors themselves pointed out, they wrote: We may be approaching a point where we cannot be sure that we will not make all the world a laboratory and all living things experimental objects. This statement was issued in March 1955. Even then things could not have been put clearer. The lives of many people and the future of mankind was at stake; there was only one way of saving them--by stopping the tests. And that was the conclusion the Soviet Government came to. In May 1955 the Soviet Government suggested that countries having atomic and hydrogen bombs should pledge to stop testing them. However, the Soviet proposal was rejected.

Replying to a question in the House of Commons about the Soviet proposal, the British Prime Minister declared: I would remind the house that our decision to manufacture the H-bomb was announced; Her Majesty's Government has no intention of departing from its decision.

About the same time, at the end of 1955, and again in connection with the Soviet proposal, Dulles said that it was being considered whether stopping tests would be in the best interests of the United States and the world. And so it was only the USSR that insisted on stopping test explosions. Britain decided to carry on with the tests and manufacture the H-bomb, the United States decided to perfect the bomb it had made.

In order to calm public opinion, the Western governments announced that there was no danger from radiation. To prove this they took part in the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation. This committee worked for almost three years before it came to any conclusion, and during this time both the Western atomic powers persisted in their refusal to get down to a serious discussion on stopping nuclear tests. The American and British declaration that tests were harmless was the first maneuver to win time in the struggle with public opinion and continue tests.

But this, of course, was insufficient. The hazards of radiation were too great to be concealed so easily. While the U.N. committee went on with its work the greatest scientists of the world continued to issue warnings about the dangers of radiation. Opening the paper in the morning people continued to read about radioactive rain that had fallen. Mushroom clouds continued to hover over the earth.

Then the West launched its second maneuver. The United States, and Britain supported it, decided to complicate the question of stopping tests. The American representative in the U.N. Disarmament Subcommittee announced that America would limit or suspend--not stop, you will notice--tests on the following conditions: 1) the existence of proper international control; 2) guarantee from surprise attack; and 3) that the production of nuclear weapons be stopped, and fissionable materials used only for peaceful purposes.